Monday, November 30, 2015

Nouriel on Europe, Immigration and Nationalism

I am on a two-week European tour at a time that could make one either very pessimistic or constructively optimistic about Europe’s prospects.

First the bad news: Paris is sombre, if not depressed, after the appalling terrorist attacks earlier last month. France’s economic growth remains anaemic, the unemployed and many Muslims are disaffected, and Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Front is likely to do well in the upcoming regional elections. In Brussels, which was semi-deserted and in lockdown, owing to the risk of terrorist attacks, the European Union (EU) institutions have yet to devise a unified strategy to manage the influx of migrants and refugees, much less address the instability and violence in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.

Outside the euro zone, in London, there is concern about negative financial and economic spillover effects from the monetary union. And the migration crisis and recent terrorist attacks mean that a referendum on continued EU membership—likely to be held next year—could lead the United Kingdom to withdraw. This would probably be followed by the break-up of the UK itself, as ‘Brexit’ would lead the Scots to declare independence.

In Berlin, meanwhile, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s leadership is coming under growing pressure. Her decision to keep Greece in the euro zone, her courageous but unpopular choice to allow in a million refugees, the Volkswagen scandal, and flagging economic growth (owing to the slowdown of China and emerging markets) have exposed her to criticism even from her own party.

In this environment, the full economic, banking, fiscal and political union that a stable monetary union eventually requires is not viable: The euro zone core opposes more risk sharing, solidarity and faster integration. And populist parties of the right and left—anti-EU, anti-euro, anti-migrant, anti-trade and anti-market—are becoming stronger throughout Europe.

But of all the problems Europe faces, it is the migration crisis that could become existential. In West Asia, North Africa and the region stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, there are about 20 million displaced people; civil wars, widespread violence and failed states are becoming the norm. If Europe has trouble absorbing a million refugees, how will it eventually handle 20 million? Unless Europe can defend its external borders, the Schengen agreement will collapse and internal borders will return, ending freedom of movement—a key principle of European integration—within most of the EU. But the solution proposed by some—close the gates to refugees—would merely worsen the problem, by destabilizing countries like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, which have already absorbed millions. And paying off Turkey and others to keep the refugees would be both costly and unsustainable.

And the problems of the greater West Asia (including Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Africa cannot be resolved by military and diplomatic means alone. The economic factors driving these (and other) conflicts will worsen: global climate change is accelerating desertification and depleting water resources, with disastrous effects on agriculture and other economic activity that then trigger violence across ethnic, religious, social and other cleavages.

If economic solutions aren’t found, eventually these regions’ conflicts will destabilize Europe, as millions more desperate and hopeless people eventually become radicalized and blame the West for their misery.

But Europe is not doomed to collapse. The crises that it now confronts could lead to greater solidarity, more risk sharing and further institutional integration. Germany could absorb more refugees (though not at the rate of a million per year). France and Germany could provide and pay for military intervention against the Islamic State. All of Europe and the rest of the world—the US, the rich Gulf states—could provide massive amounts of money for refugee support and eventually funds to rebuild failed states and provide economic opportunity to hundreds of millions of Muslims and Africans.

This would be expensive fiscally for Europe and the world. But the alternative is global chaos, if not, as Pope Francis has warned, the beginning of World War III.

And there is light at the end of the tunnel for the euro zone. A cyclical recovery is underway, supported by monetary easing for years to come and increasingly flexible fiscal rules. More risk sharing will start in the banking sector (with EU-wide deposit insurance up next), and eventually more ambitious proposals for a fiscal union will be adopted. Structural reforms—however slowly—will continue and gradually increase potential and actual growth.

The pattern in Europe has been that crises lead—however slowly—to more integration and risk sharing. Today, with risks to the survival of both the euro zone (starting with Greece) and the EU itself (starting with ‘Brexit’), it will take enlightened European leaders to sustain the trend towards deeper unification. In a world of existing and rising great powers (the US, China and India) and weaker revisionist powers (such as Russia and Iran), a divided Europe is a geopolitical dwarf.

Fortunately, enlightened leaders in Berlin—and there are more than a few of them, despite perceptions to the contrary—know that Germany’s future depends on a strong and more integrated Europe. They, together with wiser European leaders elsewhere, understand that this will require the appropriate forms of solidarity, including a unified foreign policy that can address the problems in Europe’s neighbourhood.

But solidarity begins at home. And that means beating back the populists and nationalist barbarians within by supporting aggregate demand and pro-growth reforms that ensure a more resilient recovery of jobs and incomes.

Wednesday, November 4, 2015

Nationalism on the rise in Europe and why this might not be good for the EU

The recent victory of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland confirms a recent trend in Europe: the rise of illiberal state capitalism, led by populist right-wing authoritarians. Call it Putinomics in Russia, Órbanomics in Hungary, Erdoğanomics in Turkey, or a decade of Berlusconomics from which Italy is still recovering. Soon we will no doubt be seeing Kaczyńskinomics in Poland.

All are variations on the same discordant theme: a nationalist leader comes to power when economic malaise gives way to chronic and secular stagnation. This elected authoritarian then starts to reduce political freedoms through tight-fisted control of the media, especially television. Then, he (so far, it has always been a man, though France’s Marine Le Pen would fit the pattern should she ever come to power) pursues an agenda opposing the European Union (when the country is a member) or other institutions of supra-national governance.

He will also oppose free trade, globalization, immigration, and foreign direct investment, while favoring domestic workers and firms, particularly state-owned enterprises and private business and financial groups with ties to those in power. In some cases, outright nativist, racist parties support such government or provide an even deeper authoritarian and anti-democratic streak.

To be sure, such forces are not yet in power in most of Europe. But they are becoming more popular nearly everywhere: Le Pen’s National Front in France, Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord in Italy, and Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) all view Russia’s illiberal state capitalism as a model and its president, Vladimir Putin, as a leader deserving of admiration and emulation. In Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Austria, and Sweden, too, the popularity of populist, anti-EU, anti-migrant right-wing parties is on the rise.

Most of these parties tend to be socially conservative. But their economic policies – anti-market and fearful that liberal capitalism and globalization will erode national identity and sovereignty – have many elements in common with populist parties of the left, such as Syriza in Greece (before its capitulation to its creditors), Podemos in Spain, and Italy’s Five Star Movement. Indeed, just as many supporters of radical leftist parties in the 1930s made a U-turn and ended up supporting authoritarian parties of the right, the economic ideologies of today’s populist parties seem to converge in many ways.

In the 1930s, economic stagnation and depression led to the rise of Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Franco in Spain (among other authoritarians). Today’s brand of illiberal leaders may not yet be as politically virulent as their 1930s predecessors. But their economic corporatism and autocratic style are similar.

The reemergence of nationalist, nativist populism is not surprising: economic stagnation, high unemployment, rising inequality and poverty, lack of opportunity, and fears about migrants and minorities “stealing” jobs and incomes have given such forces a big boost. The backlash against globalization – and the freer movement of goods, services, capital, labor, and technology that comes with it – that has now emerged in many countries is also a boon to illiberal demagogues.

If economic malaise becomes chronic, and employment and wages do not rise soon, populist parties may come closer to power in more European countries. Worse, the eurozone may again be at risk, with a Greek exit eventually causing a domino effect that eventually leads to the eurozone’s breakup. Or a British exit from the EU may trigger European dis-integration, with the additional risks posed by the fact that some countries (the UK, Spain, and Belgium) are at risk of breaking up themselves.

In the 1930’s, the Great Depression brought to power authoritarian regimes in Europe and even Asia, eventually leading to World War II. Today’s resurgence of illiberal state capitalist regimes and leaders is nowhere close to inciting a war, because center-right and center-left governments still committed to liberal democracy, enlightened economic policies, and solid welfare systems still rule most of Europe. But the toxic brew of populism now gaining strength may yet open a Pandora’s box, unleashing unpredictable consequences.

This rising tide of illiberalism makes avoiding a break-up of the Euro-zone or the EU ever more vital. But, to ensure this, macro and structural economic policies that boost aggregate demand, job creation and growth, reduce income and wealth inequality, provide economic opportunity to the young, and integrate rather than reject refugees and economic migrants will be needed. Only bold policies can halt Europe’s slide toward secular stagnation and nationalist populism. Timidity of the type witnessed in the past five years will only increase the risks.

Failure to act decisively now will lead to the eventual failure of the peaceful, integrated, globalized, supra-national state that is the EU, and the rise of dystopian nationalist regimes. The contours of such places have been reflected in literary work such as George Orwell’s 1984, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, and Michel Houellebecq’s latest novel Submission. Let us hope that they remain confined to the printed page.